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Abstract: 
 Modern comprehension of religion and violence, particularly modern attitudes 
toward religious violence, is the main topic of this paper. Mainstream secularization theory states 
that religion triggers conflict, tension, oppression, violence, and even war. As a continuation of this 
theory, the “myth of religious violence” assumes that religion is intrinsically connected with terror. 
These two narratives provide no sufficient proof for their claim about the irrelevance of religion; 
nonetheless, these narratives are expressions of the human agent’s struggle in his/her search for 
meaning. Referring to Gianni Vattimo’s idea of weak thought (pensiero debole), this writing 
proposes a narrative that treats religious and spiritual dimensions of human identity as essential for 
human life, as a source of remarkable consolation and hope in enduring the terror of violence, and 
as an opening to the new transcendental dimension of the ultimate meaning of human life.  
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Introduction 
The place of religion in a democratic society and the inevitable presence of violence are 
probably the two most puzzling issues of any liberal and secularized Western society. The way we 
relate to religion and violence shapes not only our society but also the process of making our own 
identity. Charles Taylor describes the process of making our identity as a dynamic and ongoing 
search for a meaningful life, in which the understanding of our own agency is “closely connected to 
our understanding of our moral and spiritual predicament, and of our moral existence” (Taylor 
1994, 185). By definition, this search explores religious and spiritual dimensions of human existence 
which present areas wherein the human agent, as a spiritual being, confronts the darkest elements 
of his/her existence, including suffering, violence, and death.  
Our comprehension of religion and violence in general, and in particular our attitude 
toward religious violence, is the main argument of this writing. The key question is where we place 
religious violence in our construction of modern identity. Our argument opposes the narrative that 
violence has spiritual roots and that it exists as something ontologically bound to human existence. 
We will start with the mainstream secularization theory that has been inclined toward neglect and 
dismissal of religion from the public sphere because religion triggers conflict, tension, oppression, 
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violence, and even war (chapter one). A continuation of this theory presents the “myth of religious 
violence”, based on the assumption that religion is intrinsically connected with terror (chapter two). 
Despite their apparent persuasiveness, these two narratives provide no sufficient proof for their 
claim about the irrelevance of religion and leave us with an ambiguous comprehension of violence; 
nonetheless, they are expressions of the human agent’s struggle in his/her search for meaning 
(chapter three). By analyzing the limits and insights of Gianni Vattimo’s idea of weak thought 
(pensiero debole), I argue for a narrative that challenges the human agent living in modernity to treat 
religious and spiritual dimensions as something essential to his/her human life, and not as 
something existing at his/her arbitrary disposal. Modernity needs to rediscover spirituality as a 
source of remarkable consolation and hope, empowering us to endure the terror of violence, and 
opening us to a new and transcendental comprehension of the ultimate meaning of our lives.  
 
Neglect and Dismissal of Religion from the Public Sphere in the Mainstream 
Secularization Narrative 
Recalling some unpleasant events from history, the advocates of the mainstream 
secularization theory argue that religious issues trigger conflict, tension, oppression, and even war.1 
The founders of the modern social sciences, from Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and Auguste Comte, 
to Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Sigmund Freud, predicted the institutional differentiation of 
the religious and secular spheres, as well as the privatization of religion, followed by its 
marginalization and decline. Additionally, modern science would soon provide satisfactory answers 
to unknown questions, and democracy would discover adequate grounds for a peaceful life. For 
this reason, religion should be kept apart from the public sphere, or even done away with entirely. 
The peak of this assumption presents the conviction that “God is dead,” a slogan repeated many 
times in modernity referencing Nietzsche. In short, religion should be replaced with exclusive 
humanism, which places the human agent at the center of the whole universe, able to reorganize all 
of reality in a better way without reference to any religious or spiritual dimension.     
In opposition to such a conclusion, Charles Taylor in his book, A Secular Age, critically 
analyzes and develops mainstream secularization theory, claiming that secularization, which is 
deeply rooted in modern Western societies, can be understood only through a historical perspective 
of the pre-modern period. Many changes have taken place in the last 500 years in the areas of art, 
literature, human and natural sciences, politics, and society. There is a degree of agreement that 
there has been some decline of religious belief and practices: religion has gradually withdrawn from 
the public sphere; modernity with its modern technology makes it difficult for us to believe or relate 
to any kind of magical and enchanted world; urbanization, industrialization, and the development 
of class society has had a negative effect on previously existing religious forms. All these features 
present sufficient evidence for mainstream secularization theorists that religious belief and practices 
are disappearing in modernity.  
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In Taylor’s reflection, these theories appear plausible only to people with a certain view of 
religion and the meaning of secularization (Taylor 2007, 434). The theories presuppose that 
religious belief and action can only function for a distinct goal or purpose, such as bearing the 
misery, suffering, and despair of the human condition. Once we control our human condition, 
society, and nature, religion should lose its functional connection to these goals and purposes, and 
consequently disappear. As a way out of such misunderstanding of religion, Taylor distinguishes 
between two different ways of understanding the process of secularization and different facets of 
secularity.   
(1) The term secularization designates different phenomena: the decline of religious belief 
and practices; the withdrawal of religion from the public sphere due to social fragmentation, 
disappearance of community, rationalization, urbanization, and the rise of modernity; the 
repression and reduction of the influence of religion; and the disenchantment or distancing from a 
magical world. It is a fact that all these changes are taking place in modernity. It would be erroneous, 
however, to conclude that religion is disappearing due to these changes. In Taylor’s reflection, we 
can trace in the last 500 years of our Western history many changes and new ways of understanding 
Church institutions, expressions of faith, ways of placing religion in society, and other phenomena 
related to religion, faith, and spirituality. New forms and practices of religious and non-religious life 
have continuously been replacing those proving disruptive and unviable. So we cannot deduce that 
religion has constantly been present and functioning in the exact same way in different periods of 
history; changes are part of this process of replacement. Consequently, the process of secularization 
in modernity presents nothing new and extraordinary: changes in the social, political, economic, 
religious, and spiritual spheres form a part of our history as well as a part of the transformation of 
religious practices.  
(2) Although mainstream secularization theory argues that belief and religious practices are 
declining and falling off in modernity, Taylor disagrees with this position. In modernity, we are at 
the end of a move from a society in which belief in God is unchallenged and unproblematic, to a 
society in which belief in God is once again understood to be one option among many, and 
frequently not the easiest one to embrace. Taylor characterizes this move as the change that “takes 
us from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, 
even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others” (Taylor 2007, 3). Certain 
experiences that were previously more or less occluded or left aside are returning now to the 
forefront as new possibilities. Taylor describes this phenomenon of an increasingly expanding 
number of options and alternatives in the field of religion in terms of the nova effect, what he defines 
as “spawning an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options, across the span of the thinkable 
and perhaps even beyond” (Taylor 2007, 299).  
Taylor argues that there are different sources from which the nova effect originates. One of 
them is the human agent’s belief in the creation of a new order of freedom and mutual benefit, 
based on the agent’s reason, modern technology and new discoveries in material nature, which are 
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constantly reinforcing the sense of power in the agent. The second possible source is the sense of 
flatness and emptiness that the modern human agent experiences in his/her life within the 
immanent frame, in which s/he lays aside the transcendent. The sense of the fragility of meaning, 
the search for an overarching significance, the perceived flatness of the agent’s attempts to solemnize 
the crucial passages of human life, and the emptiness of the ordinary, become more and more 
evident. People do not necessarily seek the cure for these malaises through a return to transcendence 
or in the traditional forms of religion; their search for meaning might take place through a different 
reading of the same immanence. They may find meaning in Nature, in the wisdom of the old, in 
bearing and loving children, in living a more natural life, or in the elaboration of more demanding 
standards of justice and solidarity.  
In other words, secularization in Taylor’s reflection represents much more than the retreat 
of religion from the public sphere. We should rather talk about the forces, unease, and spiritual 
dissatisfaction underlying so many of the changes of the last 500 years, and ask ourselves where the 
modern human agent in modernity hopes to find his/her fulfillment, fullness of life, and 
flourishing, which means having a fuller, richer, deeper, more worthy and admirable life. What 
moves the human agent in modernity towards his/her transformation, wholeness of life, or 
harmony? The crucial question for modernity is whether people recognize in their search for 
fullness something beyond their lives (Taylor 2007, 16-17). Does their search for fullness include a 
good that is transcendent, i.e. independent of human flourishing?  
Taylor distinguishes between two different understandings of human flourishing, and both 
of them are hard to justify. The first one claims that the power to reach fullness lies within the 
human agent, who feels capable of facing meaninglessness, the hostility of the universe, the violence 
of human actions, and of finding a set of rules likely to bring him/her to the fullness s/he seeks. In 
short, s/he wants to be the kind of person for whom this life is fully satisfying. On the other hand, 
the believer believes that human fullness requires reference to God or something beyond his/her 
life. The fullness of life will come to him/her, most likely through another being capable of living 
and giving. In short, s/he feels the need to be opened, transformed, brought out of the self, and 
receptive to a power that transcends him/herself (Taylor 2007, 7-8).  
Whichever way to human fulfillment one embraces, s/he will face a similar dilemma: is the 
fullness of life based on immanence or transcendence, and is the search for fullness inclusive or 
exclusive? Instead of searching for a dogmatic definition and accurate description of human 
flourishing, Taylor proposes some general guidelines for how to reach this fullness and flourishing 
(Taylor 2007, 609-612). Our search for fullness should not be reduced to the requirements of the 
disciplined, disengaged rational agent, who is willing to sacrifice his/her spontaneity, creativity, and 
feelings. Fullness of life should be based on the integration of all human forces, drives, and desires 
into something that allows us a more harmonious and whole life. The rational, emotional, sensual, 
creative, and spontaneous aspects of bodily existence have to find their place in this concept of 
harmony and wholeness. All aspects of human life, including violence, sex, and suffering, have to 
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find their place in this harmony. In other words, every aspect of human life should be integrated, 
especially the highest spiritual, religious, and moral aspirations (Platovnjak 2015, 8-10).   
In the words of David M. Jones, secularization as a significant achievement of Western 
modernity has failed to silence the quest for meaning or the urge to find alternative ways of 
satisfying this existential human need (Jones 2014, 7). Taylor’s reflection offers us an insightful 
framework for where and how to place religion in our modern society. By referring to religion as an 
inevitable factor of our social and personal life, we can start dealing with the dilemma of religious 
violence.  
 
The Secularized Myth of Religious Violence 
As shown in the previous chapter, the mainstream secularization narrative struggles to 
incorporate religion and the innermost dimensions of an agent’s existence as an essential part of the 
agent’s search for meaning and fulfillment. Even though this narrative has almost completely lost 
its intellectual appeal, nowadays an updated version of this narrative challenges intellectuals in the 
form of “the myth of religious violence” and the conviction that religion is a transhistorical and 
transcultural concept inclined to violence (Cavanaugh 2009, 3-4).  
Like any other myth, even the myth of religious violence does not provide a sufficient rigor 
of logic or evidence for its claim. Additionally, the message of this myth remains unquestioned 
because modern society constantly creates new categories through which it conforms to the myth, 
on the one hand, and on the other, what society presents as real gradually takes on the color of myth. 
So, it becomes “very difficult to think outside the paradigm that the myth establishes and reflects 
because myth and reality become mutually reinforcing” (Cavanaugh 2009, 6). No wonder this 
myth has become so powerful and widespread, especially after September 11, 2001.  
The anatomy of this myth is based on a strong conventional wisdom of secularized Western 
societies that religion is absolutist, divisive, not sufficiently rational, and consequently dangerous. 
This myth assumes that religion includes a transhistorical and transcultural feature of human life, 
which has a peculiarly dangerous inclination to promote violence, including killing and dying in the 
name of religion. For this reason, religion should be distinct from “secular” features, such as politics 
and economics; the modern and liberal nation-state, as it has developed in the West, with its rational 
and peace-making interventions, feels the need to control and eventually remove the irrational, 
absolutist, divisive, and fanatical impulses of religion from political life. 
Cavanaugh’s reflection does not negate the fact that ideologies and practices - including 
Islam, Christianity, and other religions - can promote violence under certain conditions. Similarly, 
new religious movements and violence are often closely intermingled (Lewis 2011). Nonetheless, 
this myth of religious violence is incoherent and problematic when it states that religions, such as 
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, are necessarily more inclined toward violence than 
ideologies and institutions that are identified as secular: violent use of nationalism, capitalism with 
its invisible hand of the market, liberalism, Marxist utopias, and others. So-called secular institutions 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 1, 2018 
119 
and ideologies can be as absolutist, irrational, and divisive as those called religious. The history of 
the past century proves that its secular ideologies have caused far greater suffering in the modern 
world than religious ones. If this is the case, why should religious institutions be considered more 
inclined to violence than those that are non-religious? People do violence on behalf of those things, 
either religious or non-religious, which they take seriously enough to do violence for.  
At this point, Charlene P. E. Burns’ reflection about the origin of religious violence can be 
very insightful. When someone claims that religion causes violence, s/he is making a mistake in 
logical thinking, because s/he is treating religion, an abstract concept, as though it were a concrete 
entity, having agency in its own right. By speaking this way, s/he makes a scapegoat of an 
abstraction, which allows him/her to distance him/herself from the issue and reduce his/her sense 
of personal responsibility (Burns 2008, 6-7). Following this interpretation, the myth of religious 
violence creates in the modern human agent new space for peace, indifference, and intellectual 
satisfaction.          
How come the violence labeled “religious” is considered virulent and reprehensible in 
liberal Western societies, while the violence labeled “secular” hardly counts as violence at all. Secular 
violence seems to be inherently peacemaking, necessary, and sometimes praiseworthy, especially 
when we are dealing with the inherent violence of religion. Equal attention should be given to both 
secular and religious violence because in both cases we are talking about the same phenomenon: 
violence. The distinction between secular and religious violence is unhelpful, misleading, and 
mystifying. 
Just as the myth of religious violence does not pass a critical examination, neither does the 
concept of religion as something existing beyond history and manifesting itself in all cultures. 
Religion is not something that exists beyond human nature or outside of human history; it is always 
embedded in a certain historical context, or in a given configuration of power and authority. For 
this reason, it is presumptuous to have an all-inclusive or descriptive definition of religion. Scholars 
and non-scholars in different times and different places refer to different meanings with the term 
“religion”. For example, Émile Durkheim claims that religion is at its core a social phenomenon or 
an eminently collective thing formed by beliefs and practices relating to the realm of the sacred 
(Durkheim 1915 37; 43-4). Clifford Geertz defines religion as a system of symbols which acts to 
establish powerful and stable moods and motivation in men and formulates conceptions of a 
general order of existence (Geertz 1979, 79-80). Max Weber states that religion is “the relationship 
of me to supernatural forces which takes the forms of prayer, sacrifice, and worship” (Weber 1963, 
28). A more complete definition of religion also includes sacred texts, leaders, religious buildings 
and places, land, money, religious tradition, and much more. In addition, Gregg introduces a 
distinction between religions in theory and in practice. Religion, such as Christianity, Islam, 
Buddhism, exists in theory, but in practice, these religions do not exist as singular units; there is 
much diversity within each religion across time and space. Religions in practice are changing over 
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time according to historical contexts, responding to political, social, and cultural circumstances, 
which makes them different across time and space (Gregg 2014, 14).  
With all these and other attempts to define religion, Cavanaugh - referring to Charles 
Kimball - rightly concludes that there is no essence of religion such that we all know it when we see 
it. “What counts as religion and what does not in any given context is contestable and depends on 
who has the power and authority to define religion in any given time and place” (Cavanaugh 2009, 
59). The category of religion is a construct, powerfully present in the ideology of the West since the 
rise of modernity, both in Western cultures and in the colonization of non-Western cultures. 
Religion is “a term that constructs and is constructed by different kinds of political configurations” 
(Cavanaugh 2009, 58).  
In other words, the very definition of religion is part of the history of Western power, which 
has with its so-called empirical observations and neutrality come to the conclusion that religion 
causes violence. Cavanaugh concludes at the end of his book The Myth of Religious Violence that 
the same definition of religion, and consequently the myth of religious violence, is already an 
expression of Western power, which legitimatizes certain kinds of political and social practices and 
delegitimizes others. This myth was created as a promotional tool of Western secular forms of 
governance, which believed that for the creation of a peaceful and prosperous world, the dangerous 
impulses of religion should be separated from politics. This myth fosters the idea that Western 
secular social orders are inherently peaceful and rational. Consequently, the idea of Western 
peacefulness justifies secular violence against religious actors, whose irrational violence must be met 
with rational violence. By marginalizing religious discourses and practices, the secular and liberal 
states hope to reinforce adherence to a secular social order, which Gregg calls “earthly salvation” 
(Gregg 2014, 17).  Individuals, societies, and nations, as well as animals and the environment, are in 
a state of decline and need to be restored to a particular order and a state of harmony and justice. In 
view of this restoration, justification of certain means, including violence, seems to be acceptable. 
In reaction to such threats, religiously motivated violence and violent interpretations of a faith arise; 
“religiously motivated violence is often a reaction to radical changes to society and political order, 
drastic changes that compel religious groups to take defensive action” (Gregg 2014, 4).  
In short, the myth of religious violence has become a very useful tool in authorizing certain 
types of power by marginalizing certain religious practices, and by reinforcing and justifying “our” 
attitudes and policies against “theirs”. We are talking about a widespread phenomenon in Western 
traditions, also well known in other non-Western traditions, as Nicholas F. Gier shows in his The 
Origins of Religious Violence: An Asian Perspective. History and our modern times present us with 
a myriad of examples of religiously motivated violence: the Crusades, Hindu-Muslim riots, 
Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka, battles over Jerusalem, the current declaration of jihad against the 
West, and so on. What the motivation behind all these examples of religious violence could be is 
our next question.  
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Plurality of Interpretations based on Vattimo’s Weak Thought  
The narrative of mainstream secularization theory, as presented in Taylor’s writing, 
overlaps in many aspects with the myth of religious violence, analyzed in Cavanaugh’s reflection. 
Both narratives are based on a very specific and narrow definition of religion, reducing religion to 
something private, irrational, ancient, impractical, linked to violence, and as such unable to find its 
place in modern liberal society. In agreement with the main thesis of Harrold J. Ellens’ reflection 
about the destructive power of religion, this article supports the thesis that these two narratives 
adopt an apocalyptic worldview based on the ancient principle of dualism, in which good and evil 
are pitted against one another and given transcendental and cosmic dimensions. The main 
psychosocial and political problem of modern and post-modern culture, in Ellens’ view, arises from, 
or maybe returns to, the ancient apocalyptic worldview based on the split between good and evil, 
or God and evil. This ultimate dualism became the model for explaining the meaning of everything, 
from the unconscious level of the Western person to the sociopolitical dimensions of Western 
culture. “It becomes the primal archetype of our understanding, reflecting a schizoid 
misunderstanding of the real way things are” (Ellens 2004, 3). In this perspective, Hannah Arendt 
claims that totalitarian ideologies of the past century attribute sacred status to an earthly political 
concept: the race, the nation, the proletariat, the planet itself, and the like. This sacralization 
provides the space for an apocalyptic clash between the decadent past about to perish, a present that 
reveals the opportunity for radical change, and the potential to realize an ideal future (Arendt 1951, 
472-9).   
Consequently, the human agent in modernity feels the call to be actively engaged in the 
battle between good and evil. Ignoring and pushing away the religious dimensions as something less 
relevant and too old-fashioned for modernity, together with the belief that evil exists ontologically 
and can be controlled and finally eradicated, are two expressions of the cosmological worldview 
based on dualism. The present time reveals an opportunity for radical changes and engagement that 
can easily justify the inclusion of violence, terror, and wars. Mainstream secularization theory and 
the myth of violence are expressions of hope for the human agent living in modernity, believing that 
active participation in the cosmological tension between good and evil will result in the realization 
of an ideal future. Individual involvement in this tension is very appealing and spiritually rewarding; 
the human agent feels responsible for his own future, willing to win the war for God and the good. 
The always victorious heroes in action movies, popular literature, money-making music, and radical 
TV programs can be taken as expressions of this fight. The eternal combat also reflects itself in 
political policy, international relations, social values, as well as in the heart of each individual. When 
such cosmological interpretation about the fight between good and evil acquires a cultural and 
social function, it produces enormous potential for violence both at the individual and social levels 
(Ellens 2004, 6).       
The return of the cosmological worldview based on dualism might seem a surprise, 
considering the fact that Western societies are historically rooted in two thousand years of 
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Christianity, which is a worldview that opposes and denies dualism. What opened the door and 
created new space for the re-emergence of ancient dualism? It would not be an exaggeration to 
assume that a cosmology based on dualism was never completely eradicated in the last two millennia 
of Western history. Whenever human thought deviates from, or even completely denies, the idea of 
an absolutist principle or a monotheistic vision, this reopens space for dualism. Similarly, when the 
human agent believes in an unbridgeable gap between immanence and transcendence, s/he stops 
looking for the Absolute. Or when the human agent is not able to accept his/her own finitude, even 
the space for the infinite remains concealed, and consequently, the agent gives up his search for the 
Absolute. All this creates new space for alternative, i.e. non-monotheistic, cosmological 
interpretations. 
Gianni Vattimo’s philosophical reflection, based on the idea of “weak thought” (pensiero 
debole), presents an interesting paradigm for our investigation about the reasons for the rebirth of 
dualism in modernity. Vattimo argues that the philosophy of the 19th and 20th century, especially 
the philosophical writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger, involved the denial of stable structures of 
Being, to which thought must adapt itself in order to find itself upon stable structures. By reducing 
or denying something stable, we open the door to radical transformation and deconstruction of 
Western values. Such transformation and deconstruction are possible when we step aside from 
interpretations based on a single ideological principle. This is the key idea in Vattimo’s book The 
Adventure of Difference, published in Italy in 1980, in which he argues in favor of Nietzsche’s 
“eternal return” and Heidegger’s “overcoming of metaphysics,” two key factors allowing us to think 
differently. Once we are able to think differently, which means not reducing everything to one 
single principle, we can accept Vattimo’s description of Nietzsche’s Superman as “liberated for 
differences and the multiplicity of experiences” (Vattimo 1993, 3). This Superman is also able to 
accept the disintegration of unity, and consequently any definitiveness or dialectical harmonization. 
With this perspective, Vattimo continues, we should read Heidegger’s Being and Time as a 
philosophy of decline, “a philosophy which sees what is constitutive of Being not as the fact of its 
prevailing, but as the fact of its disappearing” (Vattimo 1993, 5). If this is the case, then the 
metaphysical tradition appears to be a tradition of violent thinking, constantly trying to unify and 
govern with sovereign and generalizing categories, so typical of pre-modern and modern 
philosophy. On the other hand, Vattimo states, post-modern philosophy recognizes the Being not 
as a unitary principle, but as an event which is constantly exposed to our interpretation. For this 
reason, Vattimo prefers to talk in terms of not ontology but hermeneutics: the Being can be only 
interpreted, and what we consider to be objective truth and facts are only the results of our 
interpretations. Consequently Vattimo claims at the very beginning of his book A Farewell to Truth 
that “everything is turning into a game of interpretations – not disinterested, not necessarily false, 
but (and this is the point) oriented toward projects, expectations, and value choices at odds with 
one another” (Vattimo 2011, XXV). In this hermeneutical framework, Vattimo places his idea of 
weak thought, i.e. a worldview in which the question of “truth” has become a game of 
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interpretation, a philosophy without a global and metaphysical vision and without a guiding 
principle or an Absolute.  
By connecting Vattimo’s idea of “weak thought” with the assumption that religion does 
not deserve a legitimate place in modernity, our reflection gains new dimensions. In modernity, 
even religion has become a matter of interpretation, conditioned by the historical events taking 
place in given spatiotemporal frameworks. Religion seems to be at to the mercy of the interpreter’s 
intentions, projects, and desires. If the interpreter’s plans are to combat evil and create earthly 
salvation, then the myth of religious violence finds its perfect justification. If religion is considered 
the source of continual conflicts and limitations of the human agent’s activity, then mainstream 
secularization theory has right to suggest limitation of religious presence from the public sphere.  
 
Rediscovery of Religion in the Globalized World  
As illustrative as mainstream secularization theory, the myth of religious violence, and 
philosophy based on weak thought might be, they provide weak grounds for their claim about the 
irrelevance or inadequacy of religion in modernity, as well as for the ontological connection 
between religion and violence. As long as we consider religion as something external and 
instrumental at our disposal, not essentially linked to the human existence, our understanding of 
religion will always remain one-sided, partial, and subordinated to the logic of human efficiency, 
growth, and benefits of the strong. In this perspective, the myth of religious violence and 
mainstream secularization theory easily find their legitimate interpretation of the rule of religion as 
something that is hindering and blocking the human agent’s efforts for a peaceful social coexistence.  
While the claim about the irrelevance and inadequacy of religion gains preferential 
attention within Western liberal societies, the rest of the non-Western world hesitates to accept as 
the best possible principle of any social organization both the claim about the irrelevance of religion 
and Western ideologies about democracy, grounded on separation of religion from the public 
sphere. If Western societies are really as democratic as they claim to be, then they should be more 
tolerant and democratic toward non-Western social and political structures, which are often based 
on religious principles.  
Would a discussion based on religious dogmas or certain absolute principles present a better 
path toward peaceful coexistence and more efficient confrontation of violence? It is not my 
intention to undermine the importance of a dogmatic approach in our reflection; nonetheless, I 
believe that religious dogmas, as a starting point, would present more obstacles than it would 
remove. At the same time, I disagree with Vattimo’s claim that there is no truth and that everything 
is a matter of interpretation. If we adopt this claim of Vattimo uncritically, we will finish with the 
position of relativism, grounded on the idea of the absence of any absolute principle and the agent’s 
inability to grasp something absolute.  
Referring to Vattimo’s book After Christianity, I suggest a different way for how to 
reintroduce a discussion about the place of religion in our time, as well as a new interpretation of 
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the connection between religion and violence. When reflecting on the place of Christianity in the 
post-modern world imbued with the process of globalization, Vattimo argues in favor of an 
ultimate foundation that would be valid for all, above and beyond any cultural differences. “The 
universal validity of an assertion can be constructed by building consensus in dialogue, though 
without claiming any right in the name of an absolute truth. Dialogical consensus may be reached 
by acknowledging that we share a heritage of cultural, historical, and technological-scientific 
acquisitions” (Vattimo 2002, 5). Vattimo goes on to claim that philosophy in post-modernity has 
recognized that it cannot grasp with certainty the ultimate foundation. If this is the case, then God 
cannot be upheld as an ultimate foundation, as the absolute metaphysical structure of the real, as 
was the case with modern rationalists and absolutist metaphysics. It follows that even philosophical 
atheism with its refutation of religious experience is no longer necessary because it does not provide 
sufficient grounds for the search for the ultimate foundation. So, we are free again, Vattimo 
concludes, to hear the words of Scripture and to read the biblical notion of creation, namely with 
the contingency and historicity of our existence; “we can think of Being only as event, and of truth 
not as the reflection of reality’s eternal structure but rather as a historical message that must be heard 
and to which we are called to respond” (Vattimo 2002, 6).   
Vattimo’s reflection on the place of Christianity in post-modernity offers us a useful 
paradigm for our reflection. In our search for an ultimate foundation that would be valid for all, 
Western post-modern philosophy needs to humbly recognize and accept other non-Western 
philosophical reflections as equal partners in search of wisdom, peaceful coexistence, and 
meaningful life. In a similar way, dialogue and search for consensus should become the guiding 
principles for monotheistic religions based on Abraham, either when they talk among themselves 
or with other non-monotheistic religions. The search for consensus should not be framed with a 
particular dogmatic question or religious principle, but in Vattimo’s words by “a historical message 
that must be heard and to which we are called to respond.” There is a call for a world united beyond 
cultural, religious, and historical differences. Are we willing to hear this call? Our answer should 
not be that type of nihilism that is anchored in its own inability to know something absolute, and 
therefore, denying the absolute. Post-modern nihilism allows us to open our reflection beyond 
traditional metaphysics toward the unexplored horizons of the absolute that will reassure us of a 
foundation in the uncertainty of the changeable world. Our answer to the call will be also an 
expression of our freedom and responsibility. Consequently, the present crisis will also become an 
opportunity for a renewal of Western democracy (Jones 2014, 199).        
Human agency in the globalized world, as well as post-modern philosophy, needs to go 
beyond the categories of thinking in terms of “what use do things have for us?” If this is the starting 
point of our discussion, then any discussion about religion will always remain one-sided, 
instrumental, and at the mercy of the interpretation of the strong. The real question is an existential 
question, “for what purpose do we exist?” In other words, the nihilist mindset of modernity 
challenges us to find something solid under our feet.  
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Religion has to do with life itself, not with some viewpoints of its utility. For this reason, 
religion and the question of violence cannot be treated from the outside as something purely 
rational and scientifically objective, like how we can study natural sciences.  When facing violence 
or innocent suffering, for example, a religious answer from the outside might be helpful, but its 
reach will remain restricted if it is not integrated into the individual or collective spiritual quest for 
meaning in life. When facing the limits of our life, religion reminds us that the ultimate meaning of 
our life is transcendental, beyond our simple existence in this changing world. The ultimate test of 
our spiritual and religious authenticity is our facing of the challenges that go beyond human 
capacities, such as, for example, the burial of an innocent child (Ellens 2004, 2-3). In this 
perspective, our challenge remains the question of whether our spiritual and religious quest and 
search for meaning enable us to live in the world of human pathos, pain, suffering, vulnerability, 
violence, wars, killing, and destruction, so that we can stay hopeful and empowered at the tomb of 
the innocent child.   
In every crucial moment of existence, the modern human agent finds himself facing a 
dilemma: either to put his faith and hope in an ontological evil and participate in a transcendental 
cosmic conflict between good and evil, or to be actively engaged in a community of weak, 
inadequate, ignorant, sick humans trying to find their way to meaning in the world. A religious 
quest might be a very helpful path to explore.  
When talking about the myth of religious violence, we have a similar dilemma: shall we put 
our hope and search for meaning in this myth, or shall we challenge its validity and go to the heart 
of this myth? An active engagement, in this case, requires from us alternative interpretations of 
historical and contemporary events, or “interpretations that do not describe the religion as under 
attack or that do not call for violence as a necessary means of defending religion” (Gregg 2014, 150). 
Mark Juergensmeyer is even more explicit in this regard when he argues for a redirection of the 
mythology by redefining the message of the myth. A different interpretation of the sacred texts, 
religious doctrine, and the heritage of tradition will provide us with abundant examples of non-
violent interpretations (Juergensmeyer 2000, 163). The reduction of religious violence is a long-
lasting project, including the informing and educating of laity, the active role of states and of 
charismatic leadership, the recognition of symbols of religion and collaboration between secular 
and religious institutions, and meaningful dialog between religions in conflict; these are only a few 
possible ideas (Selengut 2003, 232-9). Appleby R. Scott, in his book The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 
challenges the gifted religious leaders to see religion as an opportunity for a promotion of religious 
peace-building (Appleby 2000, 281). Lloyd Steffen phrases our dilemma in moral terms: How do I 
choose to be religious? The moral point of this question recommends to individuals that they decide 
to be religious in a way that they affirm life and do not support violence, injury or destruction of 
life (Steffen 2007, 276).       
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Conclusion  
 Within the framework of globalization, religion has made its reappearance in a dramatic 
fashion, in a variety of forms: from denying its constitutive role in human existence and abusing its 
empowering presence for achievement of non-religious goals, to a silent presence, creating meaning 
for the majority of humankind and providing a foundation for a new universal moral order. On the 
global level, it should not be acceptable to claim that there are only two possible solutions for how 
to integrate religion into our social and political life: either denial and diminishing of religion, or a 
theocratic vision, based on some one-sided interpretations of certain religious principles. Religions 
should be seen as a plausible opportunity to advance the cause of peace and stability, or as a powerful 
medicine. Religious peace-building is already taking shape in and across local communities plagued 
by violence, even though this process remains inchoate and fragile, uncoordinated and in need of a 
greater number of trained practitioners (Appleby 2000, 7).  
It is true that violence, including religious violence, will never completely disappear from 
our world; nonetheless, its appealing force can be diminished with alternative paths, starting with 
the eradication of violence from our hearts and minds. Subsequently, even our fear and discomfort 
in the face of alien otherness (humans, religions, traditions, transcendence) will gradually dissolve.  
 
Endnotes 
1.  Very illustrative in this regard is Peter Berger’s comment: “I do not want to be a crude empiricist, 
but it seems to me you could start making body counts. In this century, the godless have a slight 
moral edge, but if you take all of history, I am not sure.” In Adam B. Seligman, Modest Claims: 
Dialogues and Essays on Tolerance and Tradition. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dam University 
Press, 2006. p. 61. 
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